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ABSTRACT 
Malaysia has almost 175 fixed offshore platforms for petroleum production. Many of these are 
25 years old and above. Hence, Structural Integrity Management (SIM) is important for 
Malaysia. In this study, the main objectives are to compare the current practices of SIM 
worldwide, understand the effects of extreme conditions to fixed offshore structures, obtain 
Malaysia fixed offshore platform characteristics data and lastly to produce a SIM manual for 
fixed offshore structures in Malaysia. 
Structural Integrity Management (SIM) has been established in the Gulf of Mexico (GoM) and 
North Sea. However, there is no SIM framework or process to cater for Malaysian conditions. 
Therefore a SIM manual for fixed offshore structure management would greatly benefit all 
Malaysian oil and gas operators. This thesis evaluates the fixed jacket structure of an offshore 
platform only. Other structural parts such as foundations are not in this scope of study. Besides 
that, other major hazards such as earthquake, boat impact and corrosion rate are outside of the 
scope of this thesis. 
The aim of this study is to propose a Petronas Technical Specification Structural Integrity 
Management (PTS-SIM) recommended practice. Therefore the methodology of the work must 
have the following aspect 1) Literature review, 2) Interview, 3) Data gathering, 4) Evaluation, 5) 
Strategy, 6) Program and 7) Development of PTS-SIM. 
A case study was also conducted on Semarang-A (SMG-A) platform. SMG-A is a 26 year old 
platform in Sabah Operation (SBO). During the study, it was discovered that there was a gap in 
SMG-A inspection program. Prior to that, during the data gathering process, it was clear that 
most of the data was missing and scattered. Recommendations were given to close the gaps that 
were found in this study. 
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1.1 Background of Project 
Structural Integrity Management (SIM) is a continuous assessment process applied 
throughout design, construction, operations, and maintenance and decommissioning 
to assure that the structures are managed safely. The objective of the SIM process is to 
confirm that the structures are fit for purpose and maintain structural integrity 
throughout its life cycle and maybe longer. The SIM strategy will reflect the risk 
associated with the fixed platform. Where the risk is higher, the greater will be the 
rigor of the integrity management (IM) strategy and the robustness of the 
implementation program. 
The primary objective of SIM is to provide a framework to ensure the continued 
fitness-for-purpose of offshore structures. The SIM process is applicable to all 
offshore structures including fixed, floating, and subsea facilities fabricated in steel, 
other metals or concrete. 
1.2 Problem Statement 
Structural Integrity Management (SIM) has been established in the Gulf of Mexico 
(GoM) and North Sea. However, there is no SIM framework or process to cater for 
Malaysian conditions. Therefore a SIM manual for fixed offshore structure 
management would greatly benefit all Malaysian oil and gas operators. This is 
because PETRONAS currently operates one hundred and seventy five (175) platforms 
offshore Malaysia and there is no a standalone PETRONAS Technical Specification 
(PTS)-SIM guide PETRONAS in its structural integrity management. 
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1.3 Objectives 
The main objectives of this study are: 
" Compare the current practices of SIM worldwide. 
" To understand the effects of extreme conditions to fixed offshore structures. 
" To obtain Malaysia fixed offshore platform characteristics data. 
" To produce a SIM manual for fixed offshore structures in Malaysia. 
1.4 Scope of Study 
This thesis evaluates the fixed jacket structure of an offshore platform only. Other 
structural parts such as foundations are not in this scope of study. Besides that, other 
major hazards such as earthquake, boat impact and corrosion rate are outside of the 
scope of this thesis. Earthquake loading and boat impact loading may be governing 
for some structures. However, earthquake loading and boat impact are not studied and 
definite conclusions on such hazards cannot be made based upon this thesis. 
Corrosion will definitely be an important hazard for the structure but this aspect 
would need a specific investigation to evaluate the impact it has on the structural 





Past works done regarding Structural Integrity Management (SIM) are reviewed, 
summarized and comment on it based on the understanding achieved. Furthermore it 
identifies the knowledge gap in this particular topic and the problem statement for this 
final year project. 
This literature review is organized into six (6) sub topics covering as given below: 
1. Definition of a fixed offshore structure. 
2. General overview of the oil and gas industry. 
3. International codes. 
4. Engineering Integrity Systems. 
5. Recent natural disasters and impact on SIM. 
6. Summary. 
2.2 Definition of a fixed offshore structure 
The structure shown in figure 2.1 is a fixed steel offshore platform. It forms the 
backbone of the offshore industry and there are in excess of 7000 such structures 
around the world. (Mather, 1995). 
Figure 2.1: Fixed steel offshore platform 
The most common type of offshore structures in service today is the jacket structure. 
The term jacket is derived from the function of the first offshore structures: to serve as 
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guides for the piles that are driven into the soil to provide the foundation to the 
structure. The jacket is connected to the piles by welding off at the top. Hence the 
jacket carries no load from the topside and merely hangs from the top of the piles and 
provides lateral support to them e. g. against wave and wind loading. (Mather, 1995) 
2.3 General overview of the Oil and Gas industry 
The history of SIM can be traced way back nearly 60 years ago from the first fixed 
offshore platform that was installed in shallow water off the coast of Louisiana (in 
USA). Figure 2.2 shows the evolution of design process in fixed offshore platforms. 
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Figure 2.2: Evolution of Platform Design. (Westlake, et. al, 2005). 
The first fixed offshore platform was installed in year 1948 in Louisiana (figure 2). 
Component design approach was used for its design. This approach has served the 
society well; indeed, experience from in-service performance suggest that well 
maintained platforms are more robust and damage tolerant than a component based 
design approach would indicate (Westlake, et. al, 2005). But most of these platforms 
have now exceeded their design life and are over 30 years old. 
Because of this, in the early 1970s or so, engineers had to develop a new approach as 
an alternative to the component based design checks to ensure that their platform is fit 
for purpose and safe for use. As a result, new maintenance guidelines, assessment 
procedures were developed to better exploit the full capacity of offshore structures. 
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Assessment guidelines that were developed adopted the pseudo risk-based approach. 
This pseudo risk-based approach divided the platforms into risk categories, example 
high risk, medium risk and low risk. Besides that, it also considers the `failure 
consequence' of the platform. This failure consequence has three main components 
which are environmental loss, monetary loss and injuries/safety related loss. 
During this time, the O&G industry also robustly enhanced its capabilities by 
developing necessary technologies in order to gain the required confidence in the 
reliability of assessment practice. It led to an improved understanding of platform 
behavior in the harsh offshore environment and a gradual ability to better explain 
observed in-service performance. (Westlake, et. al, 2005). 
During the 1980s, which is the modem-RP2A era, Amoco pioneered assessment 
engineering for their Southern North Sea (SNS) platform fleet and their Central North 
Sea (CNS) platform Montrose Alpha (Westlake, et. al, 2005). The methodologies that 
Amoco used were not from the O&G industry. Their methodologies were derived 
from other industries such as the railway and bridge industries. The reason why 
Amoco adopted their methodologies was because these 3 industries faced the same 
problem. The problem they faced was the fitness for purpose of aging structures. 
For the SNS assessment, Amoco developed the metocean hind-cast technology. This 
was a major breakthrough because hind-cast technology was able to back predict the 
maximum wave height from measured environmental and climatic data. Also in the 
same period, Assessment, Inspection and Maintenance (AIM) Joint Industry Projects 
(JIP) were conducted for a variety of operators as well as Minerals Management 
Service (MMS) (Westlake, et. al, 2005). 
The purpose of this project was to establish a framework for accessing and 
maintaining older platforms. These can be said to be the start of the SIM journey in 
the O&G industry. During the late 1980's, MMS developed an inspection program 
and during that same period it was clearly evident that an API process was required 
for assessing the structural integrity of existing jacket platforms. It was agreed that the 
approach should be different from the design of new platforms and a new section was 
establish which is the "API RP2A, Section 17 - Assessment of Existing Platforms". 
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After the successful development of "API RP2A, Section 17 - Assessment of Existing 
Platforms", many predicted that Section 17 would solve all the assessment problems 
regarding offshore platforms. But this was not the case, severe storms and hurricanes 
that hit the GOM severely tested the assessment process. From figure 2 it can be seen 
that 1992 was the year the hurricane Andrew occurred in the GOM. 
After hurricane Andrew, significant findings were made from the application of 
integrity management and assessment engineering at that time. One of the findings 
was that all platforms that were damaged or failed were early vintage platforms of 
pre-1980 era. Platforms designed to RP2A standards in this era or to other standards 
(Pre-RP2A) are known to have certain design deficiencies', such as low decks, weak 
joints or poor framing configurations. (Westlake, et. al, 2005). 
Furthermore, platforms that were designed to modem RP2A standards had no 
extensive damage or failures. Among platforms designed using Modem RP2A, the 
only one that was damaged was found to have been caused by construction error, and 
not design deficiency. 
Recently the API subcommittee established a Task Group to develop a stand-alone 
Recommended Practice (RP) (Westlake, et. al, 2005) for the integrity management of 
fixed offshore structures. This new RP will include all the experience gained from 
many years of operational experience and technological developments. The main 
purpose of this RP is to provide guidance to owners, operators and engineers in the 
implementation and delivery of the SIM process. (Westlake, et. al, 2005). 
As a summary it can be said that SIM is an important tool for an oil and gas operator 
to have. Although SIM are used in the GOM and North Sea, it has not been used yet 
in Malaysia. Furthermore, there is no SIM framework with respect to Malaysian 
conditions such as platform data, age, risk, types of facilities and etc. 
Therefore it would be good if a SIM manual for Malaysia fixed offshore platform 
study is developed. This is to ensure that it meets the objective of SIM which is to 
make sure a structure is fit-for-purpose during its design life and sometimes longer. If 
a SIM for fixed offshore structure in Malaysia is developed, it would be a helpful to 
all the operators in this country 
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2.4 International codes. 
Structural Integrity Management (SIM) is not a standalone process for the oil and gas 
industry. The main guiding principles of SIM are the International Standard 
Organization (ISO) and American Petroleum Institute (API) standards and 
recommended practices. Besides that SIM also exploits industry personnel expertise 
and know how to increase its reliability. 
International Standards Organization (ISO) 
ISO 19902-2004 
Contains requirements for planning and engineering of the following tasks: design, 
fabrication, transportation and installation of new structures as well as their future 
removal; in-service inspection and integrity management of both new and existing 
structures; assessment of existing structures; evaluation of structures for reuse at 
different locations 
American Petroleum Institute (API) 
The American Petroleum Institute was incorporated in 1919 and is a trade company 
representing 200 companies which is involved in all the aspects in the oil and gas 
industry. The involvement of API in offshore structures was prompted by Hurricane 
Carla (1961), Hilda (1964) and Betsy (1965) which had caused damage to offshore 
platforms. (Mangiavacchi, et. al., 2005). 
The first edition on API RP2A was published in 1969 and three main areas of 
technology were initially identified which are environmental loads, foundations and 
tubular joints. The 7th edition of API RP2A was published in 1976 and proposed 
using the 100 year wave as a design condition. In 1993, the 20th edition of API RP2A 
was published and it recommended using the 100 year load conditions rather than the 
100 year wave as design basis. The latest API RP2A that is currently being used was 
published in 1999. It is the 21St edition of API RP2A. (Mangiavacchi et. al. 2005). 
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API RP 2A Section 17: Assessment of Existing Platforms: 
Provide a process of evaluating older, existing platforms to ensure that they are fit- 
for-purpose, including the use of metocean criteria that was lower than that for design 
of new platforms. 
API RP 2SIM - Recommended practice for Structural Integrity Management: 
Describes the SIM process and offer specific recommendations for in-service 
inspections, damage evaluation, structural assessment, assessment criteria, risk 
reduction and mitigation alternatives and, decommissioning of fixed offshore 
platforms. 
1 2.5 Engineering Integrity systems. 
2.5.1 Asset Integrity Management System (AIMS) 
AIMS is an integrated management system that uses knowledge to manage the risk 
associated with physical assets. AIMS guide the organization into making and 
executing the decisions regarding the assets during each step of the asset's life cycle. 
The implementation of AIMS brings a progression of change, where it actually enable 
employees to work within a set of clear, logical and well-defined processes for 
managing the physical assets essential to Petronas Carigali Sdn Bhd (PCSB) 
operations. 
The AIMS requirements are organized around the Managing Elements, Functional 
Elements and Supporting Elements of the AIMS Framework, shown in figure 2.3: 
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AIMS Framework 
1.0 AIMS Managing Elements 
1.1 HSE Management System 
1.2 Quality Management System 
1.3 Production Operations 
2.0 AIMS Functional Elements 
2.1 Leadership 
pament 2.2 Engineering and Project Mena 
2.3 Maintenance and Reliability 
2.4 task Management 
Z6 Knowledge Management 
2.6 Measurement and Contlnuous Improvement 
ý \P 
Functional 
3.0 AIMS Supporting Elements 





3.3 Infomadon Systems and Documents 
Figure 2.3: AIMS Framework. (PCSB, 2006) 
The AIM System has been designed to manage the life cycle of the physical assets, 
with primary focus on the Design/Project Management and the 
Operation/Maintenance stages. Consequently the implementation of these projects 
will affect the PCSB personnel (including contractors) who are engaged in AIMS- 
related activities in all of the stages of the equipment lifecycle. 
The AIMS implementation is designed to follow the Quality Process Model. Using 
that model will require identifying, mapping, documenting and improving the existing 
work processes that support AIMS. 
To improve AIMS, PCSB has identified that communication between personnel in 
PCSB was lacking and therefore the organization identified communication as a key 
success factor in having a successful AIMS. 
The AIMS Communication Plan describes the processes and products that will 
publicise AIMS throughout PCSB and aid in managing the AIMS-related changes. 
The four major steps of the AIMS Communication Process are: Awareness, Launch, 
Education and Implementation, illustrated in Figure 2.4. 
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Figure 2.4: AIMS Communication Phases. (PCSB, 2006) 
The AIMS Communication Process will provide the appropriate level of detail to the 
various personnel across the PCSB organization. The Education and Implementation 
steps will complement each other to create a continuing cycle of planning, 
implementation, measurement, and improvement, designed to support a world-class 
Asset Integrity Management System for PCSB. 
Table 2.1: Comparison between the Traditional Maintenance Management System 
and the AIMS. 
No Traditional Maintenance Management 
System 
Asset Integrity Management System 
1. Short to medium term perspective Life-cycle 
2. Time based approach Risk based approach 
3. Cost reduction Cost Optimization 
4. Common engineering practices World best practices 
5. Performance correction Performance improvement 
2.6 Risk Based Inspection (RBI) 
In the oil and gas industry, there are two extremes type of inspections; unfortunately 
both are undesirable to the operators. One is that very little inspection is done. This is 
undesirable because less inspection would result in less platform information 
acquired. The second type of inspection is inspection is done very often. This is also 
undesirable because it involves cost. More inspection means higher cost. (Patel 2005). 
American Petroleum Institute (API) has published a recommend practice for 
inspection intervals (API - 510). Unfortunately there is no logical method in 
determining when it can be done. (Patel , 2005). 
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RBI uses risk as a basis to give priority to types of inspection and inspection intervals 
programs. The methodology of RBI allows it to set inspection and maintenance to a 
platform in such a way that it gives priority to higher risk platforms before paying 
attention to lower risk platforms. (Patel , 2005). 
The RBI system determines the likelihood of failure and consequence of failure. A 
risk is defined as: 
Risk = Likelihood of Failure X Consequence of Failure 
Likelihood of failure describes the failure per year and also the cause of failure of the 
structure. As for consequence, it touches on the number of fatalities, cost and to 
understand the failure mode. It groups a structure into High, Medium and Low 
inspection risk. Because of these groups, it can be easily decided which platform 
should be inspected first and which platform should be inspected last. (Patel , 2005). 
The purpose of having this RBI is to identify which platforms is high risk, to design 
an inspection program and to manage the risk so that it doesn't fail. (Patel , 2005). 
The RBI process consists of performing risk assessment of structure; determine 
inspection frequency and scope of work. The risk assessment is done to determine the 
current and anticipated condition of the platform. 
It can be done by asking the following: 
1. Rate of marine growth. 
2. Rate of corrosion. 
3. Scouring condition. 
The summary of the RBI process showing each steps and inspection planning based 
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Figure 2.5: RBI process flow diagram. (Patel , 2006). 
2.6 Recent general disasters and impact on SIM. 
2.6.1 Hurricane Ivan 
Hurricane Ivan was the strongest hurricane of the 2004 Atlantic hurricane season. 
Hurricane Ivan was formed on 2nd September 2004 and dissipated on 24th September 
2004. The highest wind speed that was recorded during Hurricane Ivan was 270 km/h, 
passed on the north-northeast path striking the Florida-Alabama coast on Sept. 15, 
2004. In its path there were 150 platforms and 10,000 miles of pipelines which were 
smashed by this hurricane. 
At the peak of the storm, the data obtained by the National Data Buoy Centre 
recorded a significant wave height of 52.5 ft. Given the duration of the storm and a 
significant wave height of 52.5 ft, the maximum wave height was recorded at 
approximately 90 ft. 
Seven structures were destroyed by Ivan, namely: 
" Two braced caisson 
" Four typical jacket structures in 250 ft of water 
" One typical jacket structure in 479 ft of water 
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At least six additional platforms sustained major damage. Examples of major damage 
include bent structural supports, collapsed rig derricks, severely damaged production 
vessels and piping, overturned helicopter decks, and collapsed living quarters. 
The two braced caisson that were destroyed were installed in 1985 and 1988 
respectively. The depth of one of the caisson was 80 ft and the other was 120 ft. Four 
of the platforms destroyed, installed between 1969 and 1972, were in water depths 
between 232 and 255 ft with deck heights between 40 ft and 46 ft. All these platforms 
were designed based on the requirements of earlier editions of API RP 2A. 
API released the fourth edition of its RP 2A in 1972. Analyst believed the failure of 
the eight-pile fixed platform installed in 1984 in 479 ft of water was due to mudslide 
movement in conjunction with the direct effects of Ivan. The intensity of the soil 
movement during Ivan exceeded expectations. 
After Ivan, API set up a committee whose charge was to reorganize RP 2A. New 
platforms will continue to be addressed in API RP 2A. Those sections of the current 
edition of RP 2A associated with the assessment of existing platforms i. e. Section 17 
of API RP2A will form the basis of a new API publication RP2 SIM (Structural 
Integrity Management). 
In addition, API will remove some sections of RP 2A associated with specific design 
requirements, such as fire and blast, creating a third API standalone document. This 
reorganization will result in a risk management perspective in managing offshore 
platforms and also includes lesson learnt from Ivan. 
2.6.2 Hurricane Rita and Katrina 
Hurricane Katrina formed over the Bahamas on23`d August 2005, and crossed 
southern Florida as a moderate Category 1 hurricane, causing some deaths and 
flooding there before strengthening rapidly in the Gulf of Mexico. It was formed on 
23rd August 2005 and dissipated on 30`h August 2005. The highest wind speed that 
was recorded during hurricane Katrina was 280km/h. 
Hurricane Rita was formed on 17th September 2005 and dissipated on 24th September 
2005. The highest wind speed that was recorded during Rita was 285km/h. It was also 
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the fourth-most intense Atlantic hurricane ever recorded and the most intense tropical 
cyclone ever observed in the Gulf of Mexico. 
The consequence of Hurricane Katrina on structural integrity failure is devastating. 
The normal production in the Gulf of Mexico is 547.5 million barrels of oil and 3.65 
trillion cubic feet of gas per year. 
In preparation for Hurricane Katrina, 17.1 million barrels of oil and 84.2 billion cubic 
feet of gas were shut in. The production of oil in the Gulf of Mexico fell by 1.4 
million barrels a day. This accounted for 95% of the daily production of oil. The 
equivalent of 3.4 billion cubic feet of natural gas per day was shut in. This is over 
34% of the daily production of natural gas in the Gulf of Mexico. (McCaskill, 2006). 
Two weeks after Hurricane Katrina struck the Gulf of Mexico over 120 oil and gas 
platforms were still shutdown. Nearly 60% of the gulfs daily production of oil and 
gas remained blocked from the market due to the evacuations of personnel in 
preparation for Hurricane Katrina. (McCaskill, 2006) 
By September 11th, 21 oil refineries, a combined total of 47% of US distillates, were 
still not functioning. 11 of the 21 oil refineries were scheduled for operation during 
the next week. Six more of the refineries were scheduling operations within the next 
30 days. The remaining four refineries all suffered serious damage. 
None of them would be returning to full capacity by the end of the 2005. The refinery 
which sustained the most damage was actually the largest one. It required extensive 
rebuilding. The relighting and rebuilding processes would cause the US a deficit of 
25% of the total supply. (McCaskill, 2006). 
Figure 2.6 shows both the paths of Hurricane Rita and Katrina. The orange dots are 
denoting mobile rig locations and the grey dots are denoting all fixed manned 
platforms. Due to the combination of the more westerly path of Hurricane Rita and 
the width of Hurricane Katrina most of the 2900 platforms in the Gulf of Mexico were 
affected. (McCaskill, 2006). 
By September 11th, 60% of off-shore oil production was working. The reports 
officially were that approximately 150 rigs were severely damaged though at least 500 
14 
of them were not inspected. 36 rigs were sunk and several were floating free, having 
broken moorings. (McCaskill, 2006). 
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Figure 2.6: Path of Hurricane Rita and Katrina and location of fixed platform 
(McCaskill, 2006) 
The impact of all these three hurricanes can be summarized in figure 2.7: 
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Figure 2.7: Summary of Hurricane damages due Ivan, Katrina and Rita 
It can be observed that 118 offshore platforms were destroyed in the 3 hurricanes that 
were discussed above. The most costly hurricane that has hit the GoM is hurricane 
Rita. Hurricane Rita destroyed more platforms compared to hurricane Ivan and 
Katrina. Figure 2.7 shows that hurricane Rita destroyed 65 platforms compared to 
hurricane Ivan and Katrina which destroyed 46 and 7 platforms respectively. 
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Many of the 200 platforms in Malaysia have exceeded their design life. Such 
platforms require a fitness for purpose assessment before they can continue to be 
used. Generally platforms are assessed using the Petronas Risk Based Inspection (P- 
RBI) tool. The aim of this study is to propose a PTS-SIM recommended practice. The 
methodology of the work must have the following aspect: 
1. Literature Review 2. Interview 
3. Data Gathering 4. Evaluation 
5. Strategy 6. Program 
7. Development of PTS-SIM 8. Gantt Chart 
3.2 Literature Review 
As the summary it can be said that SIM is an important tool for an oil and gas 
operator to have. Although SIM are used in the Gulf of Mexico (GoM) and North Sea, 
it has not been used yet in Malaysia. Furthermore, there is no SIM framework with 
respect to Malaysian conditions such as platform data, age, risk, types and etc. 
Therefore it would be good if a SIM manual for Malaysia fixed offshore platform 
study is being carried out. This is to ensure that it meets the objective of SIM which is 
to make sure a structure is fit-for-purpose during its design life and sometimes longer. 
If Malaysia is able to come out with its own SIM for fixed offshore structure, it would 
be a helpful to all the operators in this country. 
The difference between AIMS and SIM is that AIMS is an Asset Integrity 
Management and caters for all of PCSB assets whereas SIM will only cater for the 
structural integrity of a platform. Besides that AIMS main objective is to manage the 
risk associated with physical assets whereas SIM is to manage the risk of structural 
integrity failure of offshore platforms. 
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Risk Based Inspection (RBI) has been carried out within Petronas Carigali Sdn Bhd 
(PCSB) and is a common practice with all the operators worldwide. The only 
differences are the conditions or the criteria that is being used by each operator to 
score its platforms. The score results basically would categorize a platform in 5 
categories Very High Risk, High Risk, Medium Risk, Low Risk and Very Low Risk. 
The inspection plans would then be tailored based on the category of each platform. 
RBI is important in Structural Integrity Management (SIM) because the data source 
for SIM is the RBI tool. Therefore this SIM study would include RBI as one of its 
main components to increase its reliability. 
This study was conducted solely based on Malaysian waters with reference to GoM, 
North Sea and Petronas Risk Based Inspection (P-RBI) to identify the differences in 
approach. This is because in Malaysia jacket platform are the main oilrigs compared 
to GoM or North Sea where semi submersible, jack-up rigs, Gravity Based Structure 
(GBS) etc. 
Therefore all this aspects was taken into consideration to ensure a good study is being 
carried out and a reliable SIM manual for Malaysian waters can be published. 
3.3 Interviews 
Interviews were conducted with industry specialist in the field of offshore 
engineering. Based on their experience in this field, four personnel were interviewed 
namely: 
1. Mr. Minaz S. Lalani, ATKINS. 
2. Mr. Hugh S. Westlake, ATKINS. 
3. Mr. Nigel W. Nichols, PCSB. 
4. Mr. Yusoff Tapri, ATKINS/SCIENTIGE. 
The author chooses these four (4) personnel because of their credibility and vast 
experience in the field of offshore engineering. Mr. Minaz S. Lalani is the developer 
of Fleet Management System (FMS), which has a concept similar to SIM and is 
currently being used in Trinidad and Tobago for British Petroleum (BP) platforms. 
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Mr. Hugh S. Westlake, the author of American Petroleum Institute (API) SIM and 
also he is currently the consultant for PETRONAS Carigali Sdn. Bhd (PCSB) 
structural integrity management system (SIMS) project. 
Mr. Nigel W. Nichols is the principal structural engineer for PCSB and has over 20 
years of experience working in the oil and gas industry. Mr. Yusoff Tapri is the lead 
engineer for ATKINS/SCIENTIGE in the structural integrity management system 
(SIMS) project and has vast experience in Malaysia oil and gas industry with 
employment in various operators, consultants and also service companies. 
3.4 Data gathering 
Up-to-date platform data is a prerequisite for SIM data process. Information on the 
original design, fabrication and installation process, inspections, evaluations, 
structural assessment, Strengthening, modification and Repair (SMR) works which all 
constitute parts of the SIM knowledge base. 
3.5 Evaluation 
Evaluation of a fixed offshore platform is a continuous process and to ensure that it is 
fit for purpose. As additional data is collected, a qualified structural engineer would 
review and evaluate the data. Evaluation does not automatically imply a structural 
analysis. Evaluation can include engineering judgment based on specialist knowledge 
or operational experience, simplified analysis or reference to research data of similar 
platforms etc. 
3.6 Strategy 
Risk associated with structural deterioration are evaluated using periodic inspection to 
detect, measure and record significant anomalies. The fundamentals of this strategy 
are risk-based evaluation of a fixed offshore structure. The SIM strategy would 
define the planning of the inspection program. The plan includes frequency of 
inspection and scope of work (SOW). 
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3.7 Program 
The program represents the execution of the detailed scope of work required to 
complete the activities defined in the SIM strategy. To complete the SIM process, all 
data collected during the SIM program must be fed back into the SIM data 
management system. 
3.8 Development of PTS - SIM Code 
The development of a PTS-SIM code would be a great benefit to Petronas. The PTS- 
SIM code would start off with the purpose of developing this code and the scope that 
would be covered. It has to be understood that the SIM process only covers the jacket 
structure of a platform. The SIM process consists of 1) Data gathering, 2) Evaluation, 
3) Strategy and 4) Program. 
Furthermore, the code would include what data that is needed to execute the first 
stage of the process. After execution of stage 1, the second stage will discuss the 
evaluation of the platform. This evaluation will be done based on the data received in 
stage 1. After that, stage 3 is the strategy. The strategy that would be undertaken is 
based on the evaluation result in stage 2. The strategy will cover types of inspection, 
inspection requirements and scope of work. The last stage will be the program where 
it would touch on how to reduce the platform risk and implementation of scope of 
work. 
3.9 Gantt Chart 
The Gantt chart refers to this final year project schedule. The author has developed 
this schedule to ensure that proper planning is done prior to the start of this project. 
This is to ensure that the project is completed on time without any delays. Summary 
of project Gantt Chart can be referred to Appendix 5. 
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CHAPTER 4: 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
4.1 Introduction 
The aim of this research is to be able to carry out a structured and comprehensive 
study of structural integrity management (SIM) operations and to come out with a 
manual of how to manage a fixed offshore platform in Malaysian waters. The findings 
of this study is reported and discussed below. 
4.2 Outline for Structural Integrity Management (SIM) 
Table 4.1 below shows the proposed SIM outline that would be discussed in this 
research. The SIM outline consists of four (4) main processes which are 1) Data, 2) 
Evaluation, 3) Strategy and 4) Program. These four (4) main processes and its sub- 
processes will be discussed more in this chapter. 
Table 4.1: SIM proposed outline 
1. Data Characteristic 3. Strategy Long term plan 
Yearly Inspection Scope of Work definition 
Assessment Decommissioning Schedule 
Data Management 4. Program Routine Inspection 




The characteristic of platforms is important because it gives details on the structure. 
The details that are provided in this section are: 
1. Platform details 
2. Generic details 
3. Operational details 
Summary of platform characteristic data can be referred to Appendix 1. 
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43.1 Platform details 
It is important to include this following criteria or information about platforms for the 
purpose of structural integrity management (SIM). The engineer that has been 
assigned to perform SIM has to get all the required data's either from the consultant, 
fabricators or project team. The data that is required are shown in table 4.2. 
Table 4.2: Platform details 
1. Platform Name 6. Operational status 11. Sold or salvaged 
2. Field 7. Installation method 12. Reuse candidate 
Platform 
details 
3. Platform Type 8. Year/date of 
installation 
13. Orientation of 
platform 
4. Platform function 9. No in complex 14. Latitude 
5. Heritage 10. Linked platforms 1. Longitude 
Platform Name 
Platform name is basically the ID of a platform. All the platforms in the world have a 
platform name. Furthermore, platform name is closely linked with the oilfield that it is 
situated. For example the Pulai oilfield, the platforms are named Pulai A and Pulai B 
respectively. 
Field 
Field is basically the oilfield from which oil is being extracted. Currently in Malaysia 
there are about 35 oilfields. For example some oilfields in Malaysia are Pulai, Duyong 
and Dulang. 
Platform tune 
For fixed offshore platform, the most common platform used is the jacket leg 
platform. In Malaysia there are currently 175 jacket leg platform operated by Petronas 
Carigali Sdn Bhd. (PCSB). 
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Platform function 
The usage of a platform is dependent on its function. The function of a platform can 
be divided into 10 categories. These 10 categories are shown in table 4.3. 
Table 4.3: Platform function 
1. Wellhead 2. Drilling 3. Drilling and production 
Platform 
4. Production 5. Quarters 6. Mini production 
function 7. Compression 8. Flare 9. Riser 
10. Vent 
Currently, as of today, based on interviews conducted with Petronas staffs, there are 
40 wellhead platforms, 40 drilling platforms, 4 drilling and production platforms, 35 
production platforms, 6 living quarters, 2 mini production platforms, 13 compression 
platforms, 3 flare platforms, 3 riser platforms and 17 vents platforms. 
Heritage 
Since Petronas was incorporated in 1973, most of their platforms were operated by 
foreign oil companies such as Shell and Exxon Mobil. This is because they did not 
have the technology to operate their own platforms. But after the set up of Petronas 
Carigali Sdn Bhd in 1978, most of the platforms were handed back to PCSB for 
operation. Therefore if a platform is handed back to PCSB from a foreign oil 
company, it has to be stated in the heritage column the previous operators of the 
platform. For example if the previous operators were Shell, then in the heritage 
column, the name Shell has to be recorded. 
Operational status 
Operational status of a platform describes whether the platform is active or non active. 
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Installation method 
Installation method describes the method used to install the platform at its site. This 
document can be obtained from the fabricators. This is because most fabricators are 
also involved in the installation process of a platform that they had constructed. For 
instance Kenchana HL Fabricators are also involved in the installation process of the 
platforms that they had constructed. 
Year/Date of installation 
The year and date of installation is crucial because it determines the age of the 
platform and the date gives some idea of the weather conditions in that area during 
installation. This data can be useful for future installations. 
Number in complex 
A complex basically describes an oilfield that has numerous platforms with different 
functions. As for the number in complex criteria, it requires the number of the 
platforms situated in that complex. This number is given by the operators of that 
oilfield and in this case it is Petronas Carigali Sdn Bhd (PCSB). 
Linked platforms 
Linked platform describes whether a platform is linked with another platform. It is 
usually linked by a bridge. 
Sold or salvaged 
"Sold or salvaged" describes a platform whether it is going to be sold or not after its 
design life. The engineer in charge should state YES or NO based on decisions made 
by the operator. 
Reuse candidate 
Reuse candidate is the opposite of "sold or salvaged". This is because if the platform 
is not sold, then it would be reused. The decision depends on the operator. 
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Orientation of platform 
Orientation of platform describes the orientation of the platform according to wind 
conditions. There are 8 orientations of platforms, which are shown in table 4.4. 
Table 4.4: Orientation of platform 
1. North 2. South 
Orientation of 
3. East 4. West 
Platform 5. North-East 6. South-East 
7. North-West 8. South-West 
Latitude 
Latitude can be described as a measurement of location of a particular platform north 
or south of the equator. The lines of latitude consist of horizontal lines running from 
east to west on maps. 
Longitude 
Longitude can be described as a measurement of location of a particular platform. It is 
a east-west geographic coordinate measurement. A line of longitude is called a 
meridian and it represents half of a great circle. 
4.3.2 Generic Details 
A generic detail can be described as a detail that belongs to a large group of objects, 
which in this case a fixed offshore platform. The engineer that has been assigned to 
perform SIM has to get all the required data's either from the consultant, fabricators 
or project team to facilitate him/her. The data that is required for this Structural 
Integrity Management (SIM) subtopic is shown in table 4.5. 
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Table 4.5: Generic details of platform 
1. Water depth 2. Jacket height 3. Air gap 4. Deck 
elevation 
5. Long 6. Tran framing 7. No of bays 8. No of legs 
Generic framing 
Details 
9. No of piles 10. No of skirt 11. Grouted 12. Jacket 
piles piles weight 
13. Deck 14. Pile weight 15. Base length 16. Base width 
weight 
Water depth 
For a fixed offshore structure, the depth of water that it can be installed in is limited. 
The importance of knowing the water depth is to establish the elevation of boat 
landings, fenders, decks and corrosion protection. The maximum allowable water 
depth for a fixed offshore platform is currently 282 meters. 
Jacket height 
The jacket height of a platform has to be more then the water depth. Currently in 
Malaysia waters the deepest water depth for a fixed offshore platform is 282 meters. 
Air gap 
Air gap can be described as the air gap between the underside of the lowest part of the 
cellar deck and the maximum extreme storm case crest elevation. The air gap should 
be 1.5 meters based on Petronas Technical Specifications (PTS). If there is seabed 
subsidence, it should be acknowledged and additional air gap should be allowed. 
Deck elevation 
Deck elevation can be described as the elevation of the lowest deck which will give 
the allowable clearance to allow movement of wave crest. This is done to prevent the 
wave crest from impacting on the platform. 
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Number of bays 
Number of bays in the platform. 
Number of legs 
This indicates the number of legs in the platform. For a fixed offshore structure, 
normally there would be 4,6, or 8 legs. 
No of skirt piles 
Skirt piles can be described as additional piles connected through the sleeves at the 
base of the platform. The leg and piles then would anchor the platform and prevent it 
from overtopping due various loading conditions. 
Grouted piles 
State whether the platform uses grouted piles or non-grouted piles. If yes, specify the 
number of grouted piles used. 
Jacket weight 
Jacket weight would be in the range of 5,000 to 20,000 MT. The largest jacket that is 
currently in the world weights 35,000 MT. 
Deck weight 
Deck weight is between the ranges of 10000 MT to 50000 MT. 
Base length 
The length of the platform which is in line with platform north. 
Base width 
The width of the platform which is perpendicular to platform north. 
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4.3.3 Operational details 
The operational details contain data regarding the operation of the platforms. The 
engineer that has been assigned to perform SIM has to get all the required data's 
either from the consultant, fabricators or project team to facilitate him/her. Data 
required in this section is listed below in table 4.6. 
Table 4.6: Operational details 
1. Manned or 
unmanned 
2. Shore distance (Km) 3. Quarters capacity 
4. No of slots 5. No of conductors 6. No of risers 
7. No of casings 8. No of decks 9. No of cranes 
Operational 
Details 
10. Maximum crane size 11. Boat landing 12. Helipad 
13. Corrosion Protection 
type 
14. Oil production 
(BOPD) 
15. Gas production 
(MCFD) 
16. Soil type 
Manned or unmanned 
Manned: Platforms that is continuously occupied by workers. 
Unmanned: Platforms that is not continuously occupied by workers. 
Shore distance 
Distance the platform is to the shore. 
Quarter's capacity 
If the platform has living quarters. State the capacity of the living quarters that it can 
accommodate. 
Number of Slots 
Number of drilling slots available on the platform. 
27 
Number of conductors 
State the number of conductors are there on the platform. 
Number of risers 
Risers are the vertical portion of a subsea pipelines arriving on or departing from a 
platform. They link the wellhead and the drilling platform. State the no of risers are 
there on the platform. 
Number of caisson 
Caisson is the pipe extending vertically downwards from an installation into the sea as 
a means of disposing of waste waters, or for the location of a sea water pump. State 
the no of caisson are there on the platform. 
Number of decks 
Number of decks for the platform. 
Number of cranes 
Crane is materials-handling device fitted with a rotating jib. A hook suspended from 
the jib is used to lift and move loads. State the number of cranes on the platform. 
Maximum crane size 
State the maximum crane size allowed based on the platform design. 
Boat landing 
A boat landing is attached to the jacket after installation at an offshore location. 
Helipad 
Helipad is a site for the helicopters to land and take off. State whether the platform 
has a helipad or not. 
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Corrosion protection type 
Should be designed in accordance with NACE RP-01-76 
Oil production (BOPD) 
Barrels of oils produced per day. 
Gas production (MCFD 
Volume of gas produced per day. 
Soil e 
Type of soil for the jacket foundation has to be stated. . 
4.4 Yearly Inspection 
The yearly inspection criteria are important to determine the inspection history of the 
platform. It can be divided into two main sub topics which are: 
1. Inspection summary 
2. Survey details 
Summary of platform inspection data can be referred to Appendix 2. 
4.4.1 Inspection summary 
This sub topic describes the inspection summary that is carried out on the platform. 
The data included can be referred to table 4.7. 
Table 4.7: Inspection summary 
1. Platform name 2. Inspection name 3. Inspection year 
Inspection 4. Inspection no 5. Inspection type 6. Contractor 
summary 
7. Inspection 8. Inspection Level 9. Other works details 
description 
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From table 4.7, it is observed that the number 9 of the table refers to `other works 
detail'. This `other works detail' of the inspection program are shown in table 4.8. 
Table 4.8: Other work details 
1. Weld monitoring 2. Marine growth monitoring 
3. Debris clearance 4. Anode confirmation 
Other works details 5. Scour repair 6. Corrosion survey 
4.4.2 Survey details 
This sub topic describes the survey detail that is carried out on the platform. The data 
that is required for the survey details are shown in table 4.9. 
Table 4.9: Survey details 
1. Video inspection 2. General visual 3. Marine growth 
Survey details 
4. Scour 5. Cathodic 
protection 
6. Anodes 
7. Debris 8. Risers 9. Caisson 
10. Conductors 11. Flooded 12. Welds 
13. Wall Ultrasonic Test (UT) 
Video Inspection 
All video inspections should be kept by the operators. This is to ensure that when 
future inspection is done, the operators can refer to the previous video inspection if 
there are any abnormalities to the platform such as cracks, dents etc. 
General Visual 
General visual can be described as normal checks done by operators or inspectors 
without any equipment. The required visuals that have to be acknowledged are shown 
in table 4.10. 
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Table 4.10: General visual 
1. Dents 2. Cracks 3. Abrasions 
General Visual 
4. Bows 5. Severed 6. Holes 
7. Gouges 8. Missing members or equipment 
Marine growth 
The marine growth data would be available from the underwater inspection report. 
The 3 main data that is required is: 
1. Water depth 
2. Average marine growth 
3. Allowable marine growth based on design specifications 
Scour 
Scour is the removal of the seabed in the vicinity of the jacket by tidal action. In the 
Structural Integrity Management (SIM) procedure, the scour data has to be kept by the 
operators. Scour can be divided into two parts which are: 
1. Local scour 
2. Global Scour 
In both of these parts, the data that is needed are: 
1. The scour depth 
2. Allowable scour depth by design 
Cathodic protection 
Cathodic protection is used to prevent corrosion on jacket members. Petronas Carigali 
Sdn Bhd (PCSB) operated platforms currently uses sacrificial anodes to protect its 
jackets. The data that is required for cathodic protection are: 
1. Allowable values (Max, Average, Min) 
2. Potential values (Max, Average, Min) 
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Anodes 
The data is required for platform anodes is the anode grade and no of anodes are there 
on the platform. 
Debris 
Any debris that is on the platform or in the surrounding areas has to be stated. 
Risers 
Any abnormalities on the riser have to be stated for instance crack, dent or paint 
removal. 
Caisson 
Any abnormalities on the caisson have to be stated for instance crack, dent or paint 
removal. Besides that the number of casings has to be stated also. 
Conductors 
Any abnormalities on the conductors have to be stated for instance crack, dent or 
paint removal. Besides that the number of casings has to be stated also. 
Flooded 
Flooded members have to be tested and the results have to be stated. The data that is 
required for flooded members are: 
1. Number of test done. 
2. Number of full flooded test done. 
3. Number of partial flooded test done. 
4. What members the test was conducted on. 
If a member is flooded, it shows that it is leaking and the welding was not done 
properly. Furthermore if the flooded members fail because of anomalies or a hole in 
it, it can affect the strength of the member and subsequently effect the structural 
integrity of the platform. 
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Welds 
Weld checks are important to make sure there are no leaks and cracks on the welded 
members. Furthermore weld data from the fabrication yard is important to make sure 
all the welders follow strict guidelines and codes that are approved by Petronas 
Carigali Sdn Bhd. 
Wall Ultrasonic Test (UT) 
Wall ultrasonic test is done to check for leaks on tubular joints. The test results have 
to be kept for future reference and part of Structural Integrity Management (SIM) 
process. 
4.5 Assessment 
A platform fitness-for-purpose assessment is a detailed evaluation or structural 
analysis that has to be carried out because it determines the platform strength against 
the acceptance criteria obtained from the design codes. This assessment can be 
divided into 4 subtopics which are: 
1. Analysis details. 
2. Analysis information. 
3. Analysis Data. 
4. Platform risk matrix 
Each of these is explained below. Summary of platform analysis data (Refer: 
Appendix 3). 
4.5.1 Analysis Details 
The data that is required for "analysis details" is shown in table 4.11. 
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Table 4.11: Analysis Details 
1. Platform Name 2. Analysis ID 3. Analysis Year 
Analysis Details 4. Analysis Type 5. Analysis 
Software 
6. Analyst 
7. Analysis Description 
4.5.2 Analysis Information 
This is the data necessary for the assessment. The data should mostly be available 
from existing platform characteristic data and inspection data. The data should be up- 
to-date and reflect the condition of the platform at the time of the assessment. The 
data that are required is shown in table 4.12. 
Table 4.12: Analysis Information 
1. Drawings 2. Weight 3. New Metocean 4. Pile data 
database criteria Analysis 
Information 5. SACS 6. Full 7. Summary of assessment results 
model assessment 
results 
4.5.3 Analysis Data 
Analysis data is the data that is required for an analysis/assessment to be carried out. 
The data should be up-to-date and reflect the condition of the platform at the time of 
the assessment. The data that are required is shown in table 4.13. 
Table 4.13: Analysis Data 
1. Caisson 2. Conductors 3. Tide 
4. Maximum wave 5. Deck Elevation 6. Deck Load Analysis Data height 
7. Marine growth 8. Scour 9. Conductor 
subsidence 
10. Corrosion 11. Damage quantity 12. Crack Quanti 
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4.5.4 Platform Risk Matrix 
The result of this assessment would then be input into the risk matrix. The risk matrix 
will be explained more in the evaluation section. (Section 4.9). 
4.6 Data Management 
Data management is crucial in ensuring the effective implementation of this SIM 
process. This is because with less data, assumptions have to be made in ensuring the 
fitness for purpose of an offshore platform. Therefore one of the vital and simple data 
management systems that can be used by an operator is the Data document Index 
(Refer: Appendix 4). This data document index would include data such as platform 
name, field, risk ranking and all the data that is available to the platform. 
4.7 Malaysia platform age frequency 
Besides the Structural Integrity Management (SIM) outline, the author also has 
managed to gather some information about Petronas Carigali Sdn Bhd (PCSB) 
operated platforms. There are currently 175 platforms operated by PCSB in 3 
different regions. These 3 regions are Peninsular Malaysia Operations (PMO), Sabah 
Operations (SBO) and Sarawak Operation (SKO). 
Figure 4.1 shows the number of platforms in Malaysian water that has exceeded its 
design life of 25 years. There are 90 platforms in Malaysian waters that have 
exceeded its design life of 25 years. The section that is highlighted shows the number 
of platform that has exceeded its design life of 25 years. 
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Figure 4.1: Number of platforms vs. Age frequency 
Figure 4.2,4.3 and 4.4 shows the distribution of the ages of platforms for Peninsular 
Malaysia Operations (PMO), Sabah Operations (SBO) and Sarawak Operations 
(SKO) respectively. 
Summary of Facilities Design Life for Sarawak Operation 





1-10 Yrs 11-15 Yrs 16-20 Yrs 21-25 Yrs 26-30 Yrs > 30 Yrs 
Figure 4.2: Number of platforms in SKO vs. Age frequency. 
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Summary of Facilities Design Life for Peninsular Malaysia 
Operation 








Figure 4.3: Number of platform in PMO vs. Age frequency. 
Summary of Facilities Design Life for Sabah Operation 
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Figure 4.4: Number of platforms in SBO vs. Age frequency. 
4.8 Fixed offshore platform facilities in Malaysia 
> 30 Yrs 
1 
> 30 Yrs 
From the data that was available to the author, figure 4.5 below would briefly 
illustrate the types of platform that is operated by PETRONAS in Malaysia. The types 
of platforms range from drilling, wellhead, production, gas compression, living 
quarter, vent and riser. As can be seen, drilling platforms constitute about 26% off the 
overall platform category in the country. The lowest number of platforms belongs to 
the category of "mini production facility" with only 1.2% out of the total platforms. 
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Figure 4.5: Different types of offshore platforms in Malaysia 
4.9 Data Evaluation 
The second framework for Structural Integrity Management System (SIM) is the 
evaluation process. The SIM evaluation applies engineering knowledge to assess the 
impact of new data on an existing platform. Besides that this evaluation process 
would be able to establish the future strategy and programs that can be carried out for 
the platform. This is to ensure that the platform meets the objectives of SIM which is 
to ensure that the platform is fit for purpose. Besides that this evaluation process 
would result in an appropriate strategy for inspection, monitoring, and 
commissioning/ decommissioning of a platform. 
This evaluation process is carried out throughout the life span of a platform. As long 
as there is new data that is being received by the operator, evaluation of the data has 
to be carried out using engineering knowledge to identify any problems on the 
platform and take appropriate actions to rectify it. This evaluation process is not an 
engineering analysis process for example structural analysis. It is merely an 
evaluation of data of a platform and mostly engineering judgments based on specialist 
knowledge or operational experience, simplified analysis, or reference to research 
data, detailed analysis of similar platforms or similar works that has been carried out 
by other operators in that specific region. 
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The factors to consider during evaluation of platform structural data are as below: 
1. Platform age, condition, original design criteria. 
2. Analysis results and assumptions for original design or subsequent assessment. 
3. Platform reserve strength and degree of structural redundancy. 
4. Degree of conservatism or uncertainty in metocean criteria. 
5. Fabrication quality and occurrence of any rework or re-welding. 
6. Occurrence of any damage during transportation or installation. 
7. Extent of inspection during fabrication, transportation, and installation. 
8. Previous inspection findings. 
9. Learning from structural performance of other platforms. 
10. Platform modifications, additions, and repairs/strengthening. 
11. Accidental (i. e., fire, blast, vessel impact, dropped object, etc. ) or metocean or 
other design event overload. 
12. Past performance of corrosion protection system. 
13. Criticality of platform to other operations. 
14. Platform location (frontier area, water depth). 
15. Platform monitoring data if available. 
Sometimes for operators, the availability of data is a problem. Most contractors do not 
have adequate data of their platform. It has to be remembered that inadequate data 
would impact the evaluation process because no data means no evaluation and this 
would result in a problem for operators. Without evaluation no strategy and programs 
can be develop for the platform. Overall the SIM process would be affected. 
It is advised that if an operator does not have data such as the platform characteristics, 
surveys of the specified platform can be carried out to obtain the data and further 
visual inspections can be done to detect any anomalities at the platform. 
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4.9.1 Risk Categorization of a fixed offshore platform 
Petronas Carigali Sdn Bhd. (PCSB) categorizes its platform based on a risk based 
inspection (RBI) tool. This SIM process is associated with the RBI tool because the 
higher the risk the platform possesses, the higher the need for a SIM process to be 
carried out on the platform. Risk can be defined as: 
Risk = Consequence of failure x Likelihood of failure 
After a risk value has been assigned to a platform, a risk matrix is developed to give a 
clearer picture of the risk of the platform for people to be able to understand. PCSB 
does this by using a risk matrix. There are two types of risk matrix, 1 is the 3 by 3 
matrix and the other is a5 by 5 matrix. PCSB uses the 5 by 5 matrix to categorize 
their platforms. 
4.9.2 Risk Matrix 
A risk matrix is developed based on defined parameters. Those two parameters are 
Likelihood of failure and Consequence of failure. These parameters are scored and 
have different weighted factors. An example risk matrix is shown in table 4.4. 
Table 4.14: Risk Categorization Matrix Example 
5 M H H VH VH 
4 L M H H VH 
3 L L M H H 
ö 2 VL L L M H 
1 VL VL L L M 
..., a A B C D E 
Consequence of failure 




VL Very Low 
In this table the consequence and likelihood categories are arranged such that the 
highest risk ranking is toward the upper right-hand corner. The lowest risk items fall 
into category Al and the highest risk items fall into category E5. This can be seen 
from the table above. 
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4.93 Likelihood of failure 
" Factors affecting likelihood of failure 
The likelihood of structural collapse of a platform can be subjected to two factors 
namely: 
1. Platform strength or capacity. 
2. Extreme loading the platform is exposed to. 
The likelihood of failure categorization system identifies the characteristics of 
platforms that affects its structural strength and loads. The likelihood of failure of a 
platform would increase if there is an indication that there are factors attributing to the 
deterioration of platform strength or not up to current design practice. Besides that, if 
there are factors indicating that extreme platform loads may increase in frequency or 
severity, the likelihood of failure of the platform would also increase. 
In the risk ranking, an assumption is made that all jacket type platforms designed 
according to latest structural design practice to resist present day design 
environmental loads have the lowest likelihood of failure. The factors that affect the 
original strength, the maximum design loads, and the degradation of strength are used 
to measure any individual platform's failure likelihood against an ideal platform. 
Below are the factors affecting the degradation of strength of a platform and exposure 
to risk scenarios. 
Risers, conductors and caisson support 
" Because of the risk of fire or a toxic release, the failure of a riser or conductor 
can escalate to a total loss failure. 
Results from inspection reports, such as: 
" Anode grading or monitoring of the corrosion protection systems. 
" Detected damage members and cracks. 
" Flooded member surveys. 
" Member thickness measurements. 
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All of those reports above are related to the assessment of the current condition of the 
platform. The corrosion protection system has to undergo frequent maintenance and 
inspection because it contributes to the degradation of the structure. If a structure is 
corroded, its structural members have less strength and can fail easily. 
Damage and flooded members indicate that overall strength and ductility may be 
reduced if during the inspection it is found that the system has a degree of failure. 
Besides that, observed corrosion may indicate that the corrosion protection and 
coating are no longer operating effectively. 
Fitness for purpose 
" This is the main objective of SIM. To ensure that a platform is fit for its 
purpose and can continue doing so after exceeding its design life. 
Year installed 
" Over the years, the design loads used for the platform may change. The 
metocean criteria have to be studied in order to identify whether they have 
changed from the initial design values. 
Number of legs 
" Eight and six leg platforms are more redundant than three and four leg 
platforms. The number of legs together with the bracing system is a strong 
indicator of the overall redundancy and damage tolerance of a platform. 
Recent inspection history 
" Inspection would be carried out on a platform periodically based on the risk of 
the platform and also the cost. While there would be many inspection results 
throughout the years, the recent inspection history would be able to describe 
the current condition of the platform. 
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Marine growth 
" Excess marine growth may not decrease the strength of a member, but because 
marine growth increases the surface area of a member, it would result in the 
increase of drag force. If the amount on growth exceeds that assumed for the 
design, the loading on the structure would also increase. 
Change of service 
" There are various services for an offshore platform. It varies from production 
to drilling platforms and the amount of load the platform can accommodate 
also varies. For example, drilling platforms must support the weight of drilling 
equipment and drilling operation loads. If the platform service is switched to 
production, the drilling equipment is removed, the platform loads change. 
Deck elevation 
" Wave in deck increases the loading significantly. If a deck has low elevation, 
the likelihood that it would be hit by a wave is higher and might be a primary 
cause of platform failure. 
Scour depth 
" Excess scouring would expose more piles to hydrodynamic loads and this 
would result in the reduction of foundation support. Therefore would increase 
the likelihood of failure. 
" High Likelihood of failure 
The high likelihood of failure category refers to existing platforms that are likely to 
fail in the design event. Platforms in this category are non-robust, may have cellar 
decks that could be inundated during the event and/or have little tolerance to damage. 
a Medium Likelihood of failure 
The medium likelihood of failure category refers to existing platforms that are not 
expected to fail during the design event. However, these structures may sustain 
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damage that requires inspection after the design event. These are essentially 
platforms that do not meet the high likelihood or low likelihood definitions. 
9 Low Likelihood of failure 
The low likelihood of failure category refers to existing platforms that are unlikely to 
fail during the design event. This implies sufficient reserve strength for the platform's 
present condition, including all modifications and known damage, against the 100- 
year design that the platform would remain undamaged during the design event. 
Platforms in this category are robust and tolerant to damage. 
4.9.4 Consequence of Failure 
" General 
The consequence of failure has three main components. They are: 
1. Environmental loss 
2. Business loss 
3. Injuries and safety related loss 
These components are calculated based on monetary losses to the operator. This three 
component monetary losses is summed up to come out with the overall result 
consequence. 
While the resulting dollar value obtained does not represent the total amount of 
money that could be lost to a failure, this concept is adopted to combine the effect of 
safety, environmental and business losses. 
The value of hurricane damage, injury, and business losses can be estimated using 
these criteria below. These criteria are based on relations between: 
1. Platform size 
2. Crew size 
3. production rate 
4. And the consequences if one of this components fail 
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While each type of consequence is measured in a common unit (monetary losses), 
different factors determine the value of each type of loss. When possible, these 
consequence calculations are quantitative and are related to the actual economic 
values such as the price of oil and gas and the cost of development of an offshore oil 
and gas field. 
9 Environmental loss 
This is the volume of oil or other hydrocarbons released to the sea. The cost of 
cleaning up, fees and fines that would result in the spill is taken into consideration. 
" Business loss 
This is the total value of the reserve, the expected rate of return on investment, the 
expected number of months that the platform would not produce, the cost of repairing 
or replacing a damaged or a lost platform due to a collapse. 
" Safety loss 
This is the average number of crew on the platform, whether it is continuously 
manned, the type of production and the loss of crew members due to unforeseen 
circumstances. 
" High Consequence 
The high consequence of failure category refers to existing platforms that have the 
potential for well flow or sour gas in the event of platform failure. If a well flow or 
sour gas occurs, the environment would be polluted and a high cleanup cost has to be 
fork out by the operator. Besides that, these platforms support major oil pipelines and 
also offer storage capacity. All platforms in water depths greater than 400 ft. are also 
considered high consequence. 
" Medium Consequence 
The medium consequence of failure category refers to existing platforms where 
production would be shut-in during design events such as hurricane and high wave's 
conditions. The wells would contain subsurface safety valves that can be shut down in 
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case of emergency and oil storage would be limited to process inventory. Besides that 
these platforms must have surge tanks for pipelines. These surge tanks are required to 
pump and store oil when during an emergency occurs from the pipeline. These are 
essentially platforms that do not meet the high consequence or low consequence 
definitions. 
" Low Consequence 
The low consequence of failure refers to existing platforms where production will be 
shut-in during design events, the wells contain subsurface safety valves and oil 
storage is limited. These platforms may support production departing from the 
platform and low volume infield pipelines. 
It is possible that some older, larger platforms with more wells, more production 
equipment and in deeper water that is nearing the end of their useful life have a 
similar consequence of failure and can be considered low consequence. 
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4.10 STRATEGY 
The third framework for Structural Integrity Management System (SIM) is the 
strategy process. The SIM strategy is applied when the appropriate technical experts 
have come out with the evaluation results. The SIM strategy would then come out 
with a detail description that answers these following questions: 
" What type of inspection should be done 
" What is the benefits of inspection strategy 
" What are the requirements inspection strategy 
" How the inspection should be done 
These strategies that would be carried out will ensure that the platform meets the 
objectives of SIM which is to ensure that the platform is fit for purpose. Furthermore, 
it would give specific recommendations for 1) Inspection strategy and 2) Mitigation 
and risk reduction options. 
4.10.1 Inspection Strategy 
The structural inspection strategy would be developed based on the evaluation process 
that had been carried out earlier. These inspection strategies should be developed as 
soon as a platform has been commissioned. 
This is because when an operator has an inspection strategy of their platform, they can 
pre-plan all the other management aspects of inspection which is the cost, time, and 
appropriate contractors to do the inspection on a specific platform. 
But sometimes due to unforeseen circumstances like boat accidents, earthquake and 
tsunamis, these inspection strategy can be revised and updated periodically based on 
the platform performance. 
" Inspection types 
Petronas Carigali Sdn Bhd (PCSB) conducts the inspection of their platform based on 
American Petroleum Institute (API) recommended practices and guidelines. In this 
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study we would see what types of inspection can be carried out on PCSB platforms 
and the benefits of it. 
" Scheduled Inspection 
a) Baseline 
Baseline inspection is the first inspection carried out to determine the initial condition 
of a structure and to use it as a benchmark for future inspections. This baseline 
inspection is done to: 
1. Determine initial condition of equipment that is not inspected in 
fabrication or installation inspection. 
2. To check any damage that occurred on the structure during transportation 
and installation. 
b) Periodic 
Periodic inspection is carried out to determine the structural integrity of a structure at 
a certain period during its life cycle. It inspects for example the cathodic protection 
and also any anomalities that occur on the platform. 
The main aspect of periodic inspection is the interval and scope of work. The interval 
depends on the evaluation result of the platform data's and if the platform is found to 
be unsafe or very high risk, the frequency of interval would be shorter. This means 
frequent inspection in a short space of time. 
c) Special 
Special inspection contains key elements such as the objectives of inspection, 
selection of tools and techniques, scope of work and intervals. It is more like the 
periodic inspection that is carried out on a platform but the major difference is that 
special inspection conducts repairs, remediation program, known damage and defects, 
whereas periodic inspection inspects for example the cathodic protection and also any 
anomalities that occur on the platform. 
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d) Emergency 
Emergency inspection is carried out when there is an incident at the platform. This 
type of inspection is unscheduled and not planned. Emergency inspection is carried 
out on a platform due to: 
1. Extreme wave conditions that affects the structural integrity of the platform 
2. Accident at the platform for example boat accident and many more 
4.10.2 Mitigation and Risk Reduction 
Mitigation is defined as modifications or operational procedures that reduce the 
consequence exposure of the structure such as de-manning a platform, and the 
reduction of oil storage or in order to reduce the consequence of platform failure. 
Risk reduction is defined as modifications that reduce the likelihood of structural 
failure and includes such measures load reduction or an increase in system strength 
through global or local strengthening and repairing. 
4.10.3 Benefits of having an inspection strategy 
1. Reduce inspection cost by strategizing inspection to accommodate a number of 
platforms at the same location on the same time. 
2. The scope of work for the platform inspection can be done in advance and 
submitted to the consultant. This could reduce time. 
3. The inspection interval can be designed based on the evaluation of the platform. 
By having an inspection strategy, the platform need not be inspected often and 
therefore it can reduce the operator's operating expenses. 
4. By having an inspection strategy, the integrity of the platform can be preserved 




The Program represents the execution of the detailed scope of work and should be 
conducted to complete the activities defined in the SIM strategy. The Program may 
include one or more of the following: 
" Routine above water inspections: An above water inspection should be 
carried out on an annual basis. 
" Baseline underwater inspection: The baseline underwater inspection should 
be carried out to determine the as-installed platform condition, and as a 
benchmark for the future SIM of the platform. A baseline inspection should 
be conducted prior to implementation of risk-based inspection. 
" Routine underwater inspections: The routine underwater inspection should 
be carried out to provide the information necessary to evaluate the condition of 
the platform and should be carried out at an interval consistent with the SIM 
strategy adopted by the operator. 
" Special inspections: A non-routine inspection initiated by events such as a 
hurricane or collision. 
The Program represents the execution of the detailed scope of work and should be 
conducted to complete the activities defined in the SIM strategy. The Program may 
include one or more of the following activities; routine above water inspections, 
baseline inspections, routine underwater inspections, special inspections and 
Strengthening, Modification and/or Repair (SMR) activities. 
To complete the SIM process all data collected during the SIM Program should be 
incorporated back into the SIM data management framework. Consistency, accuracy 
and completeness of inspection records are important since these data form an integral 
part of the SIM framework. 
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4.12 CASE STUDY 
4.12.1 Introduction 
This case study is being carried out on SMG-A platform which is located in the 
Semarang Field offshore Sabah. SMG-A is a six leg fixed Gas Compression Platform 
and is still active. SMG-A was installed on 1/1/1983 and currently has exceeded its 
design life of 25 years. Therefore an effective SIM process is needed to ensure that 
SMG-A is still fit for purpose. 
4.12.2 Data 
a) Generic Details of SMG-A 
SMG-A is installed in water depth of 10.1 m. Its jacket height is 10.4 m. The air gap 
is 5.0 m which is above the recommended value by PTS. PTS specify that the 
minimum value of air gap should be 1.5 m above sea level for all its platforms. The 
deck elevation for SMG-A is 12.2 m. SMG-A also uses K-framing for both its 
longitudinal and transverse frames. The deck weight of SMG-A is 1361 MT. Its base 
length is 33.5 m and base width 18.3 m. See Table 4.15. 
Table 4.15: Generic Details of SMG-A 
Generic Details 
Water depth 10.1 m 
Jacket Height 10.4 m 
Air Gap 5.0 m 
Deck Elevation 12.2 m 
Long framing K 
Tran framing K 
#ofbays 2 
# of legs 6 
# of piles 6 
# of leg piles 6 
# of skirt piles 0 
Grouted Piles No 
Jacket weight NA 
Deck weight 1361 MT 
Pile weight NA 
Base length 33.5 m 
Base width 18.3 m 
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b) Operational Details of SMG-A 
SMG-A is an unmanned platform. Although it is unmanned, it also has a quarter's 
capacity of 3 people. This quarter is accommodated for inspection and maintenance 
staffs. SMG-A has 3 caissons, 0 conductors and 7 riser guards. SMG-A has 1 crane 
on its platform and 1 boat landing. SMG-A does not have a helipad. Its corrosion 
protection is the sacrificial anodes. See table 4.16. 
Table 4.16: Operational Details of SMG-A 
Operational details 
Manned Yes 
Shore distance NA 
Quarters capacity 3 
# of slots NA 
# of caisson 3 
# of conductors 0 
# of Risers 7 
Max cond. Dia. NA 
# of decks NA 
# of cranes 1 
Max crane size NA 
Boat landing Yes 
Helipad No 
CP type SA 
Oil Prod NA 
Gas Prod NA 
c) Platform Inspection Data of SMG-A 
Figure 4.6: Row 3 (A1-B3) Platform North Figure 4.7: Row I (Al-BI) Platform South 
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From its commissioning in 1/1/1983, SMG-A has undergone 2 underwater inspections 
(UI). 1 was done in 1994 and another in 2005. The data for UI in 1994 is not 
available. This UI report in 1994 is essential because it can be considered as a 
baseline UI. The more favorable condition would be that an UI should have been 
carried out in 1983. 
This is because baseline underwater inspections should be considered to determine the 
as-installed platform condition to benchmark for the future SIM of the platform, 
especially if any potential damage occurred during installation. A baseline inspection 
should be conducted before the implementation of risk-based inspection (RBI) 
planning for the platform. 
The minimum scope of work should consist of the following, unless the information is 
available from the design and installation records: 
"A visual survey of the platform for structural damage, from the mud line to top 
of jacket. 
"A visual survey to verify the presence and integrity of the anodes. 
"A visual survey to confirm of the number of installed appurtenances and their 
integrity. 
" Confirmation of the as-installed platform orientation. 
" Measurement of the as-installed platform level. 
As for the UI in 2005, the scope of work (SOW) that was carried out is explained 
below. 
d) Inspection Level 
The inspection level for UI 2005 is API Level 2. A Level 2 survey consists of general 
underwater visual inspection. It is done to detect the presence of any or all of the 
following: 
1. Excessive corrosion. 
2. Scour and seafloor instability, etc. 
3. Design or construction deficiencies. 
4. Presence of debris. 
5. Excessive marine growth. 
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Detection of significant structural damage during a Level 2 survey should become the 
basis for initiation of a Level 3 survey. The Level 3 survey, if required, should be 
conducted as soon as conditions permit. 
e) General Visual Inspection 
Forty three (43) members comprised the jacket structure. Six (6) members were 
inspected and no damage, deformation or other anomaly was found. 
f) Splashzone Inspection 
A total of twenty (20) members of the jacket pass through the air and water interface. 
These members consisted of the six (6) jacket legs and fourteen (14) vertical diagonal 
members (VDM). Inspection was completed on two (2) jacket legs and five (5) 
vertical diagonal members. No areas of coating breakdown were observed on the 
members that were inspected. No anomalies were reported during this inspection. 
g) Base level Survey 
The gap between the underside of the bottom level horizontal members and the 
seabed was estimated using divers. Scour measurements at the base level are the 
vertical separation between each horizontal members and the seabed. This distance 
was estimated at both ends and at the centre of each Face; which was at A3-B3 Face. 
The measurements for Face A3-A2-A1 were taken at leg A3 and A2. Measurements 
for the other two (2) faces were not taken. No exposed pile was observed during the 
inspection 
h) Anode inspection 
A total of twenty seven (27) anodes were found on the Jacket Structure. Only four (4) 
anodes were inspected and the depletion rate range between 20%-60%. No anomalies 
were reported for this inspection. 
i) Cathodic Potential Survey 
Thirty Nine (39) contact Cathodic Potential measurements were obtained on jacket 
nodes, risers and riser clamps. Air divers were utilized to obtain the contact CP 
measurements. The measurements ranged between (-)659mV to (-)1068mV. 
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j) Marine Growth Inspection 
A marine growth (MG) survey was carried out by air divers on Leg A3 and B3. 
Circumferential measurements were obtained from MSL to EL (-)10m in 5 meters 
increments. At Leg A3, the marine growth was most dense at EL (-)5m down to EL (- 
) lOm; measured as 84.36mm thick. Whereas at Leg B3, the marine growth was most 
dense at EL (-)10m; measured as 100.38mm thick. The Marine Growth consisted of 
Barnacles, Clams, Sponges, Hydroids, soft and hard corals. 
k) Seabed Debris 
Twelve (12) items of debris were noted during the seabed debris survey. The twelve 
(12) items were mostly metallic debris consisting of cut-off pipe section, scaffolding 
poles and grating. 
1) Anomaly Summary 
The following anomalies were found during the course of the project: 
1. Low CP measurements of (-)659mV and (-)660mV were reported on Riser no. 7. 
2. One boat landing was located at Row 3. Missing gratings were observed at lower 
stage boat landing, and at the top 3 grating steps of the stairway between the two 
stages of the boat landing. 
4.12.3 Evaluation 
a) Platform Risk Ranking 
Petronas Carigali Sdn Bhd. (PCSB) categorizes its platform based on a Platform risk 
ranking tool. This SIM process is associated with the RBI tool because the higher the 
risk the platform possesses, the higher the need for a SIM process to be carried out on 
the platform. Risk can be defined as: 
Risk = Consequence of failure x Likelihood of failure 
After a risk value has been assigned to a platform, a risk matrix is developed to give a 
clearer picture of the risk of the platform for people to be able to understand. PCSB 
does this by using a risk matrix. PCSB uses the 5 by 5 matrix to categorize their 
platforms. 
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A risk matrix is developed based on defined parameters. Those two parameters are 
Likelihood of failure and Consequence of failure. These parameters are scored and 
have different weighted factors. For SMG-A, after obtaining all the result from the UI 
done in 2005, the scores are as below: 
1. Likelihood Score : 320 5 
-b 0 2. Consequence Value : 32.34 4 
3. RSR : 3.24 3 
4. Likelihood of Failure :32 
5. Consequence of Failure :B1 




Figure 4.8: SMG-A Risk Category (Low) 
4.12.4 Strategy 
The third framework for Structural Integrity Management System (SIM) is the 
strategy process. The SIM strategy is applied when the appropriate technical experts 
have come out with the evaluation results. The SIM strategy would then come out 
with a detail description that answers these following questions: 
" What type of inspection should be done 
" What is the benefits of inspection strategy 
" What are the requirements inspection strategy 
" How the inspection should be done 
These strategies that would be carried out will ensure that the platform meets the 
objectives of SIM which is to ensure that the platform is fit for purpose. 
For SMG-A, the next inspection that should be done is a Risk Based Level 3 UI. The 
Risk Based UI should be done in year 2015. This is because according to API 
recommended practices and guidelines, since SMG-A is a low risk platform; the 
appropriate inspection interval is 11 years or greater. See table 4.17. 
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Table 4.17: Risk Based Inspection Program (API RP2A, Section 17) 
Risk 
Inspection Interval Ranges 
Category 
High 3-years to 5-years 
Medium 6-years to 10-years 
Low 11-years or greater 
Notes: 
a) The timing for the first underwater periodic inspection should be determined from 
the date of platform installation or when the baseline inspection was completed. 
b) Risk-based intervals should be adjusted to ensure uninterrupted cathodic 
protection of the platform. This should be based on data evaluation from prior 
inspections. 
Not only undertaking a risk based approach to come up with a SIM strategy, there is 
another method to be used which is the consequence based inspection program. These 
program states that the consequence-based inspection program provides a predefined 
in-service inspection program should Owner/Operator choose not to implement SIM. 
Consequence based inspection program states that for Level 3 inspection, concerning 
low risk platforms, the interval is also more than 10 years. See table 4.18. 








Interval (Years) 10 6 
Level III 
Visual Corrosion Survey X3 X3 X 
Flooded Member Detection x x 
Weld/Joint Close Visual x X 
Therefore, the most appropriate time to do a Level 3 UI for SMG-A would be in year 
2015. A Level 3 survey consists of an underwater visual inspection of preselected 
areas and, based on results of the Level 2 survey, areas of known or suspected 
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damage. Such areas should be sufficiently cleaned of marine growth to permit 
thorough inspection. 
Detection of significant structural damage during a Level 3 survey should become the 
basis for initiation of a Level 4 survey where visual inspection alone cannot determine 
the extent of damage. The Level 4 survey, if required, should be conducted as soon as 
conditions permit. 
4.12.5 Program 
As we know, SMG-A has missed its baseline inspection, the only reference data that 
is available is the UI in 1994 and 2005. The proposed inspection to be carried is the 
level 3 survey and UI in year 2015. This is because according to API recommended 
practices and guidelines, since SMG-A is a low risk platform; the appropriate 
inspection interval is 11 years or greater. 
A Level 3 survey consists of an underwater visual inspection of preselected areas 
and/or, based on results of the Level II survey, areas of known or suspected damage. 
Such areas should be sufficiently cleaned of marine growth to permit thorough 
inspection. Pre-selection of areas to be surveyed should be based on an engineering 
evaluation of areas particularly susceptible to structural damage, or to areas where 
repeated inspections are desirable in order to monitor their integrity over time. 
Detection of significant structural damage during a Level 3 survey should become the 
basis for initiation of a Level 4 survey in those instances where visual inspection 
alone cannot determine the extent of damage. The Level IV survey, if required, 
should be conducted as soon as conditions permit. 
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CHAPTER 5: 
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION 
5.1 Conclusion 
In this work, issues related to Structural Integrity Management (SIM) of fixed 
offshore platform are studied. These include a review of existing standards applicable 
for SIM namely ISO 19902-2004 Section 23 and 24 and API RP 2A Section 17: 
Assessment of Existing Platforms. However, elements of these standards were further 
investigated in this thesis to produce a recommended practice for SIM in Malaysia. 
This includes obtaining data on Malaysia's fixed offshore platforms such as types of 
facilities, age, location and also risk associated with each platform. 
A comprehensive review was also done to determine the recent hurricane disasters 
and their impact on SIM. During Hurricane Ivan, Rita and Katrina, a total of 118 
platforms were destroyed. This showed that although API improves their codes every 
time after a disaster occurs; it still could not prevent the impact of these hurricanes to 
the structure. 
A case study was also conducted on Semarang-A (SMG-A) platform. SMG-A is a 26 
year old platform in Sabah Operation (SBO). During the study, it was discovered that 
there was a gap in SMG-A inspection program. Prior to that, during the data gathering 
process, it was clear that most of the data was missing and scattered. Besides that, 
SMG-A did not undergo a baseline underwater inspection prior to its installation in 
1983. 
A baseline underwater inspection is needed to determine the as-installed platform 
condition which will serve as the benchmark for the future SIM of the platform, 
especially if any potential damage occurred during installation. Because of this, any 
damage that occurred during the installation of SMG-A was not known to the operator 
until the first underwater inspection that was carried out in 1994. 
Studies on SIM of fixed offshore platform for Malaysian waters would be a help to all 
the oil and gas operators in the country. SIM is an ongoing life cycle process for 
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ensuring the continued fitness-for-purpose of offshore fixed platforms. The SIM 
process has evolved over the years to provide industry and regulatory bodies a means 
to ensure the continued safe and reliable operation of the aging fleet of offshore 
platforms around the world. 
5.2 Recommendations and Future Works 
To improve the SIM strategy in Malaysia, based on the author's experience, there is a 
need for an efficient way of handling data of each platform that PCSB operates. It can 
be done by having a document index that monitors the movement of data in the 
organization. 
Besides that, having a standalone Petronas Technical Specification (PTS) - SIM 
would greatly enhance the capabilities of PCSB in managing its offshore structures. 
This is because Structural Integrity Management is vital life-cycle process used for 
the continued safe operation of existing offshore platforms and provides a framework 
for the assuring the fitness-for-purpose of these structures. 
Throughout the life of the facility new data is collected e. g. through periodic 
inspections, as a result of accidental events or from planned modifications or 
additions to the platform. Data may also emanate from technology development 
projects or service experience of similar structures within industry. 
This data is subject to qualified engineering evaluation to assess what impact it has on 
the existing SIM strategy for the facility. If necessary the inspection Program is 
adjusted in accordance with the change in strategy, this might mean, for example, that 
the inspection becomes more detailed perhaps moving from visual to Non Destructive 
Testing (NDT) survey techniques or vice versa. 
By having a standalone Petronas Technical Specification (PTS) - SIM, operator can 
avoid the case of SMG-A, where a baseline inspection was missed and it could 
provide operators with a more organized way to manage their platform data. As a 
result, the SIM process can be carried out effectively and the platform life can be 
extended beyond its design life of 25 years. 
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The author would also like to propose some future works that can be carried out with 
respect to SIM. Since the author has carried out a case study on a platform in 
Malaysia and found some gaps, it is proposed that more case studies are carried out on 
Malaysia's fixed offshore platforms to identify gaps in their inspection and data 
management so that actions can be taken to close these gaps. 
Besides that, this SIM process can also be used for pipelines. This is because pipelines 
are also a main component in the production of oil and gas. Therefore it is very 
important to have pipelines that are fit for purpose. Besides that, by having a SIM for 
pipelines, the pipelines can be used beyond its designed life because it is maintained 
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Operational Status Holding 
Installation method Installed 
# in complex 
Linked platfoms 

















Water depth m 
Jacket Height m 
Air Gap m 
Deck Elevation m 
Long framing 
Tran frami 
# of bays 
# of legs 
# of piles 
# of leg piles 














# of slots 
# of conductors 
# of Risers 
# of Casings 
Max cond. Dia. cm 
# of decks 
# of cranes 




Oil Prod BOPD 
Gas Prod MCFD 
Appendices 2: Platform Inspection Data 








I Inspection Level Other Work Details I 
API Level I Weld Monitoring 
API Level 2 Marine growth Cleaning 
API Level 3 Debris Clearance 
API Level 4 Anode confirmation 














Depth (ft) 0-40 40-80 80-120 >120 
Marine Growth Average in in in in 
Allowable in in in in 








Value Max Avg Min 
Cathodic 
Potential 









Test Part Positive Full 
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Maximum Wave Height m 
Deck Elevation m 
Deck Load MT 
Marine Growth mm 
Scour m 
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rn F rn r %ý 
I I '!! ': 11), Iý1,1 1I It(brm A l Pulai ' 
2 P ulai Drillin Platform B M ý 
3 Ledan Ledan Anua Drilling Platfo 
4 Tin i Tin i Drilling Platform A H 
5 Bekok Drilling Platform A M 
6 
Bekok 
Bekok Drilling Platform B L 
7 Bekok Drilling Platform C M 
8 Bekok-C Flare Jacket 
9 Tion Drillin Platform A H 
10 Tiong TioDrillin Platform B L 
11 Ke n Drilling Platform A M ý 
12 Dugong Central Processing P M 
13 Du ong Gas Compressor ressor Pla L 
14 Du on Drilling Platform A L 
15 uurumt urilliir,, I'I: ut m, I; N1 J J J ý NT 
4 "ý J ý J J 
16 yon Dugong Drilllý Platform C L 
17 Dugoý Living Quarter M 
18 Du ong Flare Jacket M_ 
19 Soton Collector Platform-A M 
20 Resak Central Processing Platform 
21 Resak Resak Drilling Platform A 
- --- -- -- 22 --- Resak Flare Platform 
23 ýling Platform A Dulang Drilling H 
- - - - - - - - - 24 --- :.: u1: 1: la -- ý 
25 
- 
ulan illing PlatformC Dulang Dr 
- -- ---- --- 
H 
-- - -- - -- - --- - - 26 Dulang Drilling Platform D H 
- -- -- - - -- - - ---- - - _ 27 FSO Puteri Dulang 
28 Malong Drilling Platform A M 
- - -- 29 
- MAS 
SotongLDrillý Platform A 
- 
M 
- - - - 30 Anding_Drilling Platform A 
- 
M 
- 31 FPSO Perintis 
32 Angsi Drilling & Riser Platf 
-- - --- 
orm A 
-- - - ---- 33 
- 
- AMsi Production and LQ A 
- -- 34 
- An Bs 
Angsi Drilliný Platform B i 
35 A4i Drilling Platform C 
- -- - --- - -- --- -- - - - 36 ? "n si DrilliNPlatform D 
37 Angsi Drilling Platform E 
38 Penara Drilling Platform A 
- -- - - - - -- --- 39 PNL --------- North Lukut Drilling Platfor 
--- ---- - 
mA 
- - - - - -- 
ý 
-- --- - - - - - 40 FPSO Bunga Kertas 
41 Abu Abu Drilling -Platform 
A 
- 
42 FPSO Abu 
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Scope of Study 
Literature review 
General Oveview of Industry 
International Codes 











23 f' Data Obtained 
24 v' Evaluation of Data 
25  Strategy for project 
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ý/ 
Presentation FYP 1 
34 Submission of progress report 2 
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37 -174 Submission of final report 
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20 days Mon 21/7/08 Fri 15/8/08 
5 days Mon 2117/08 Fri 25/7/08 
5 days Mon 2817/08 Fri 1/8/08 
5 days Mon 418108 Fri 818/08 
5 days Mon 1118108 Fri 1518/08 
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5 days Mon 25/8/08 Fri 29/8/08 
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